The Effect of DNS on Tor's Anonymity by Greschbach, Benjamin et al.
The Effect of DNS on Tor’s Anonymity
Benjamin Greschbach∗
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Tobias Pulls∗
Karlstad University
Laura M. Roberts∗
Princeton University
Philipp Winter∗
Princeton University
Nick Feamster
Princeton University
Abstract—Previous attacks that link the sender and receiver of
traffic in the Tor network (“correlation attacks”) have generally
relied on analyzing traffic from TCP connections. The TCP
connections of a typical client application, however, are often
accompanied by DNS requests and responses. This additional
traffic presents more opportunities for correlation attacks. This
paper quantifies how DNS traffic can make Tor users more vul-
nerable to correlation attacks. We investigate how incorporating
DNS traffic can make existing correlation attacks more powerful
and how DNS lookups can leak information to third parties
about anonymous communication. We (i) develop a method to
identify the DNS resolvers of Tor exit relays; (ii) develop a new
set of correlation attacks (DefecTor attacks) that incorporate DNS
traffic to improve precision; (iii) analyze the Internet-scale effects
of these new attacks on Tor users; and (iv) develop improved
methods to evaluate correlation attacks. First, we find that there
exist adversaries who can mount DefecTor attacks: for example,
Google’s DNS resolver observes almost 40% of all DNS requests
exiting the Tor network. We also find that DNS requests often
traverse ASes that the corresponding TCP connections do not
transit, enabling additional ASes to gain information about Tor
users’ traffic. We then show that an adversary who can mount a
DefecTor attack can often determine the website that a Tor user
is visiting with perfect precision, particularly for less popular
websites where the set of DNS names associated with that website
may be unique to the site. We also use the Tor Path Simulator
(TorPS) in combination with traceroute data from vantage points
co-located with Tor exit relays to estimate the power of AS-level
adversaries who might mount DefecTor attacks in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
We have yet to learn how to build anonymity networks that
resist global adversaries, provide low latency, and scale well.
Remailer systems such as Mixmaster [33] and Mixminion [12]
eschew low latency in favor of strong anonymity. In contrast,
Tor [14] trades off strong anonymity to achieve low latency;
Tor therefore enables latency-sensitive applications such as
web browsing but is vulnerable to adversaries that can observe
traffic both entering and exiting its network, thus enabling
deanonymization. Although Tor does not consider global ad-
versaries in its threat model, adversaries that can observe traffic
for extended periods of time in multiple network locations (i.e.,
“semi-global” adversaries) are a real concern [15, 25]; we need
to better understand the nature to which these adversaries exist
in operational networks and their ability to deanonymize users.
Past work has quantified the extent to which an adversary
that observes TCP flows between clients and servers (e.g.,
HTTP requests, BitTorrent connections, and IRC sessions) can
correlate traffic flows between the client and the entry to the
anonymity network and between the exit of the anonymity
network and its ultimate destination [25, 34]. The ability to
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Fig. 1. Past traffic correlation studies have focused on linking the TCP stream
entering the Tor network to the one(s) exiting the network. We show that an
adversary can also link the associated DNS traffic, which can be exposed to
many more ASes than the TCP stream.
correlate these two flows—a so-called correlation attack—
can link the sender and receiver of a traffic flow, thus com-
promising the anonymity of both endpoints. Although TCP
connections are an important part of communications, the
Domain Name System (DNS) traffic is also quite revealing: for
example, even loading a single webpage can generate hundreds
of DNS requests to many different domains. No previous
analysis of correlation attacks has studied how DNS traffic
can exacerbate these attacks.
DNS traffic is highly relevant for correlation attacks be-
cause it often traverses completely different paths and au-
tonomous systems (ASes) than the subsequent corresponding
TCP connections. An attacker that can observe occasional
DNS requests may still be able to link both ends of the
communication, even if the attacker cannot observe TCP
traffic between the exit of the anonymity network and the
server. Figure 1 illustrates how an adversary may monitor the
connection between a user and the guard relay, and between
the exit relay and its DNS resolvers or servers. This territory—
to-date, completely unexplored—is the focus of this work.
We first explore how Tor exit relays resolve DNS names.
By developing a new method to identify all exit relays’ DNS
resolvers, we learn that Google currently sees almost 40%
of all DNS requests exiting the Tor network. Second, we
investigate which organizations can observe DNS requests that
originate from Tor exit relays. To answer this question, we
emulate DNS resolution for the Alexa Top 1,000 domains from
an autonomous system that is popular among exit relays. We
find that DNS resolution for half of these domains traverses
numerous ASes that are not traversed for the subsequent
HTTP connection to the web site. We further introduce a
new method to perform traceroutes from the networks where
exit relays are located, making our results significantly more
accurate and comprehensive than previous work. Next, we
show how the ability to observe DNS traffic from Tor exit
relays can augment existing website fingerprinting attacks,
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yielding perfectly precise DefecTor1 attacks for unpopular
websites. Finally, we use the Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) [24]
to investigate the effects of Internet-scale DefecTor attacks.
We demonstrate that DNS requests significantly increase
the opportunity for adversaries to perform correlation attacks.
This finding should encourage future work on correlation
attacks to consider both TCP traffic and the corresponding
DNS traffic; future design decisions should also be cognizant
of this threat. The measurement methods we use to evaluate the
effects of traffic correlation attacks are also more accurate than
past work. Our work (i) serves as guidance to Tor exit relay op-
erators and Tor network developers, (ii) improves state-of-the-
art measurement techniques for analysis of correlation attacks,
and (iii) provides even stronger justification for introducing
website fingerprinting defenses in Tor. To foster future work
and facilitate the replication of our results, we publish both
our code and datasets.2 In summary, we make the following
contributions:
• We show how existing website fingerprinting attacks
can be augmented with observed DNS requests by an
AS-level adversary to yield perfectly precise DefecTor
attacks for unpopular websites.
• We develop a method to identify the DNS resolver of
exit relays. We find that Tor exit relays comprising
40% of Tor’s exit bandwidth rely on Google’s public
DNS servers to resolve DNS queries.
• We quantify the extent to which DNS resolution
exposes Tor users to additional AS-level adversaries
who are not on the path between the sender and
receiver. We find that for the Alexa top 1,000 most
popular websites, 60% of the ASes that are on the
paths between the exit relay and the DNS servers
required to resolve the sites’ domain names are not
on the path between the exit relay and the website.
• We develop a new measurement method to evaluate
the extent to which ASes are on-path between exit
relays and DNS resolvers. We use the RIPE Atlas [40]
platform to achieve previously unprecedented path
coverage and accuracy for evaluating the capabilities
of AS-level adversaries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents background, and Section III relates our study to
previous work. In Section IV, we shed light on the landscape of
DNS in Tor. Section V discusses our DefecTor attacks, which
we evaluate in Section VI. We then model the Internet-scale
effect of our attacks in Section VII. Finally, we discuss our
work in Section VIII and conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
We provide an introduction to the Tor network, website fin-
gerprinting attacks, as well as how the Tor network implements
DNS resolution.
1The acronym is short for DNS-enhanced fingerprinting and egress
correlation on Tor.
2Our project page is available at https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/.
a) The Tor network: The Tor network is an overlay
network that anonymizes TCP streams such as web traffic.
As of August 2016, it comprises approximately 7,000 relays
and about two million users. The hourly published network
consensus summarizes all relays that are currently online.
Clients send data over the Tor network by randomly selecting
three relays—typically called the guard, middle, and exit
relay—that then form a virtual tunnel called a circuit. The
guard relay learns the client’s IP address, but not its web
activity, while the exit relay gets to learn the client’s web
activity, but not its IP address. Relays and clients talk to each
other using the Tor protocol, which uses 512-byte cells. Finally,
each relay is uniquely identified by its fingerprint—a hash over
its public key.
b) Website fingerprinting attacks: The Tor network
encrypts relayed traffic as it travels from the client to the
exit relay. Therefore, intermediate parties such as the user’s
Internet service provider (ISP) cannot read the contents of any
packet. Tor does not, however, protect other statistics about the
network traffic, such as packet inter-arrival timing, directions,
and frequency. The ISP can analyze these properties to infer
the destinations that a user is visiting. The literature calls this
attack website fingerprinting.
Past work evaluated website fingerprinting attacks in two
settings: a closed-world setting consists of a set of n monitored
websites, and the attacker tries to learn which among all n sites
the user is visiting with the notable restriction that the user can
only browse to one of the n websites. The open-world setting
is more realistic: the user can browse to unmonitored sites
in addition to the monitored sites. Unmonitored sites are, per
definition, not known to the attacker; thus, the attacker’s traffic
classifier cannot train on unmonitored sites the user visits.
The attacker’s classifier can train on whatever unmonitored
sites it chooses, as long as the classifier has not trained on an
unmonitored site used for testing. Two relevant metrics in the
open-world setting are recall and precision. Recall measures
the probability that a visit to a monitored site will be detected,
while precision measures the probability that a classification
by the classifier of a visit to a monitored site (positive test
outcome) is the correct one. Consider a classifier with 0.25
recall and 0.5 precision: on average, every fourth visit by
the user to a monitored site will be detected, and half of the
classifications by the classifier will be wrong. Errors can either
classify a monitored site as unmonitored (lowering recall) or
vice versa (lowering precision). Mistaking one monitored site
for another is less likely [45].
Wa-kNN is a website fingerprinting attack by Wang et
al. [46] that uses a k-nearest neighbor classifier with a custom
weight-learning algorithm, WLLCC [45]. From packet traces
between a Tor client and its guard, Wa-kNN extracts a number
of features to classify each website. Useful features include
the number of outgoing packets and bursts of packets in
the same direction. In the training phase, WLLCC adjusts
weights of features extracted from sites of known classes
such that the distance between instances of the same site
(class) are minimized (collapsed). In the testing phase, Wa-
kNN determines the distance of a testing traffic trace to all
known training traces. The distance calculation results in the
k nearest classes: if all classes are the same, then the testing
trace is classified as that class, otherwise it is classified as
2
unmonitored. In the open-world setting, one class represents
all unmonitored sites both during training and testing. By
increasing k, Wa-kNN can trade decreased recall for increased
precision. We set k= 2 when using Wa-kNN for higher recall
since DefecTor is a highly precise attack.
Tor could eliminate website fingerprinting attacks with en-
crypted, constant-bitrate channels between a Tor client and its
guard; other anonymity networks could use a similar technique.
Unfortunately, the Tor network’s limited spare capacity does
not allow for such a throughput-intensive defense, but some
research has worked on making this type of defense more
efficient [8, 27, 45, 39].
c) How Tor resolves DNS requests: Tor clients must
send DNS requests over Tor to prevent DNS leakage (i.e.,
having a DNS request travel over an unencrypted channel as
opposed to over Tor itself). Tor does not transport UDP traffic,
but it implements a workaround to wrap DNS requests into Tor
cells. Using the SOCKS protocol, applications can instruct the
Tor client to establish a circuit to a given domain and port.3
After the user types in a domain, say example.com, the Tor
browser establishes a connection to the SOCKS proxy exposed
by the local Tor client. The Tor client then selects an exit
relay whose exit policy supports example.com and port 443.
Next, the client sends a RELAY_BEGIN Tor cell to the exit relay,
instructing it to first resolve example.com, and then establish
a TCP connection to the resolved address at port 443 [13,
§ 6.2]. After successfully establishing a connection, the exit
relay responds with a RELAY_CONNECTED cell. The client can
then exchange data with its intended destination. Another type
of cell, RELAY_RESOLVE, supports pure name resolution, without
establishing a subsequent TCP connection [13, § 6.4]. The exit
relay responds with a RELAY_RESOLVED cell.
Exit relays send their DNS requests to the system resolver,
which Linux systems read from /etc/resolv.conf. Tor does
not modify the system resolver and uses whatever the exit
relay operator configured, such as the ISP’s resolver, or public
resolvers such as Google’s 8.8.8.8 open public DNS resolver.
As of August 2016, exit relays cache DNS responses to
speed up repeated lookups. The caching layer for Tor clients,
however, is off by default to prevent tracking attacks due to
modified DNS responses [32].
III. RELATED WORK
This paper combines traffic analysis methods for corre-
lation attacks with website fingerprinting attacks; we discuss
related work in each of these two areas.
d) Traffic analysis and correlation attacks: Tor’s threat
model excludes global adversaries [14], but the practical threat
of such adversaries is an important question that the research
community has spent considerable effort on answering. In
2004, when the Tor network comprised only 33 relays, Feam-
ster and Dingledine investigated the practical threat that AS-
level adversaries pose to anonymity networks [16]. The authors
considered an attacker that controls an AS that is traversed
both for ingress and egress traffic, allowing the attacker to
correlate both streams. Using AS path prediction [19], Feam-
ster and Dingledine found that powerful tier-1 ISPs reduce
3SOCKS versions 4a and 5 support connection initiation using domain
names in addition to IP addresses.
location diversity of anonymity networks. In 2007, Murdoch
and Zielin´ski drew attention to IXP-level adversaries, a class
of adversaries that was missing in Feamster and Dingledine’s
work [34]. Murdoch and Zielin´ski showed that IXP adversaries
are able to correlate traffic streams, even in the presence of
packet sampling rates as low as one in 2,000.
In 2013, Johnson et al. [25] presented the first large-scale
study on the risk of Tor users facing relay-level and AS-level
adversaries. The authors developed TorPS [24] that simulates
Tor circuits for a number of user models. By combining
TorPS with AS path prediction, Johnson et al. could answer
questions such as the average time until a Tor user’s circuit
is deanonymized by an AS or IXP. Most recently in 2016,
Nithyanand et al. [36] used AS path prediction to evaluate the
practical threat faced by users in the top 10 countries using
Tor. In 2015, Juen et al. [28] examined the accuracy of path
prediction algorithms that prior work [25, 16] used to estimate
the threat of correlation attacks. The authors compared AS path
predictions to millions of traceroutes, initiated from 25% of Tor
relays by bandwidth at the AS level, and found that only 20%
of predicted paths matched the paths observed in traceroute.
Juen et al. could not consider the reverse path in traceroutes.
In 2015, Sun et al. [41] addressed this shortcoming; although
past work treated routing as static, Sun et al. showed that the
dynamic nature of Internet routing makes AS-level adversaries
stronger than previous work had considered.
We improve on previous work in two significant ways: (i)
we are the first to evaluate how DNS traffic exacerbates traffic
correlation attacks, both in concept and in practice; and (ii)
we develop and deploy a scalable, sustainable version of the
measurement method proposed by Juen et al. [28]. Our method
uses the volunteer-run RIPE Atlas measurement platform [40],
as opposed to relying on relay operators to run third-party
scripts. This approach allows us to fully automate our method
and achieve previously unprecedented scale.
e) Website fingerprinting: In 2009, Herrmann et al. [22]
demonstrated the first website fingerprinting attack against
anonymity systems—including Tor—in a closed-world setting.
In 2011, Panchenko et al. [38] greatly improved on Herrmann
et al.’s detection rate and provided insight into an open-world
setting. In 2012, Cai et al. [10] improved on previous work
by proposing an attack that used Hidden Markov Models to
determine whether a sequence of page requests all come from
the same site. The authors used an open-world setting for their
evaluation. Wang and Goldberg [47] proposed an improved
attack that employed a new method for data gathering. In
2014, Wang et al. [46] further improved on their results with
a k-nearest neighbor classifier Wa-kNN and a custom weight-
learning algorithm (WLLCC [45]) that in several rounds de-
termine the optimal weights for features extracted from traffic
traces. Cai et al. [9] determined which traffic features provide
the most predictive power to detect websites, proved a lower
bound of any defense that achieves a certain level of security,
and provided a framework to investigate the performance of
website fingerprinting attacks. Juarez [26] showed that all
previous attacks made several simplifying assumptions; the
work suggested that attacks are still difficult to run outside
a lab setting as an attacker will have to consider operating
system differences, page changes, and background traffic. Re-
cently, in 2016, Wang and Goldberg addressed many practical
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roadblocks to website fingerprinting, such as noisy data and
maintaining a training set, further highlighting the need for
website fingerprinting defenses in Tor [48].
Panchenko et al. [37] showed that webpage fingerprinting
(i.e., fingerprinting of any page on a site) is significantly
harder than website fingerprinting (i.e., fingerprinting of only
the start page of a site). Hayes and Danezis proposed k-
fingerprinting, an attack with notably better performance than
Wa-kNN even in the face of defenses [21]. Their attack
retains 30% accuracy in a closed-world setting against the
WTF-PAD defense by Juarez et al. [27]—a prime candidate
for deployment in Tor [39]—at the cost of 50% bandwidth
overhead. Juarez et al. used Wa-kNN to evaluate WTF-PAD
and set k= 5, as recommended by Wang et al. for an optimal
trade-off between recall and the false positive rate.
In this paper, we show how to correlate and use ob-
served DNS requests in concert with website fingerprinting
attacks, which significantly improves precision for website
fingerprinting. The two DefecTor attacks that we present have
implications for the design of website fingerprinting defenses:
to mitigate DefecTor attacks, open-world evaluations of the
website fingerprinting defense should minimize recall even
when the website fingerprinting attack is tuned to sacrifice
precision for recall. In the case of Wa-kNN, this means a low
k: our results are based on k = 2.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE
Before explaining our attack, we need to better understand
how Tor performs DNS resolution. We begin by investigating
how common it is for adversaries to be able to observe DNS
requests but not subsequent TCP connections of Tor users
(Section IV-A). We then seek to understand how these results
connect to the Tor network by determining the DNS resolvers
used by exit relays (Section IV-B).
A. Quantifying the additional AS exposure of DNS queries
Adversaries that can observe both DNS and subsequent
TCP traffic (e.g., the ISP of an exit relay) gain no benefit
from seeing the client’s DNS traffic, since TCP traffic is
sufficient to mount correlation attacks [34]. In this work, we
consider adversaries that can observe traffic entering the Tor
network and some DNS requests exiting the network—such as
requests addressed to DNS root servers—but not subsequent
TCP traffic from exit relays. We first determine the prevalence
of these adversaries by measuring the number of ASes that
DNS queries traverse versus the number of ASes subsequent
web traffic traverses.
We quantify the exposure of DNS traffic versus TCP
traffic as follows. We begin with Alexa’s Top 1,000 [4], a
list of the 1,000 most popular web sites as estimated by
Alexa. For each site, we conducted two experiments. First,
we ran a TCP traceroute to the site, targeting port 80 to
mimic web traffic. Second, we determined the DNS delegation
path for the website’s DNS name using the dig command’s
+trace feature. The delegation path of a domain name, say
www.example.com, is a list of authoritative DNS servers, such
as the authoritative server for .com pointing to the authoritative
server of example.com, which in turn points to the authoritative
server responsible for www.example.com. We also ran UDP
traceroutes to each server in the delegation path, targeting port
53 to mimic DNS resolution.4 For both experiments, we then
mapped all IP addresses in the traceroutes to AS numbers [42],
generating both a set of traversed ASes for DNS traceroutes
(D) and a set of traversed ASes for web traceroutes (W ). Given
these two sets for each of Alexa’s Top 1,000, we compute the
fraction of ASes that are only traversed for DNS traffic, but
not for web traffic (λ ):
λ ∈ [0,1] = |D \W ||D ∪W | . (1)
The metric approaches 1 as the number of ASes that are only
traversed for DNS increases. For example, if D = {1,2,3} and
W = {2,3,4}, then λ = |{1}||{1,2,3,4}| = 14 = 0.25. We determined
λ for each site in the Alexa Top 1,000. We ran the experiment
on a French VPS in AS 16276, owned by OVH SAS. We
chose this AS because, as of August 2016, it is the most
popular AS by exit bandwidth, seeing 10.98% of exit traffic,
closely followed by AS 12876 (owned by the French Online
S.A.S.) that sees 9.33% of exit traffic. The experiment resulted
in 1,000 λ values. We repeated the experiment on a vantage
point at our institution, achieving similar results: while a two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test determined a statistically
significant difference between both distributions (p 0.01),
the medians (0.590 and 0.584) and standard deviations (0.149
and 0.118) are similar. Nevertheless, we believe that relays in
regions other than Western Europe or North America are likely
to witness significantly different exposure of DNS queries
because many websites outsource their DNS setup to providers
such as CloudFlare whose points of presence are centered
around Western Europe and North America.
Figure 2 shows the empirical CDF of all 1,000 λ values
that we calculated for Alexa’s Top 1,000 sites. In total, this
experiment traversed 350 unique ASes for DNS requests and
339 unique ASes for web requests. The figure shows that for
half of Alexa’s Top 1,000 domains, DNS-only ASes account
for 60% or more of all traversed ASes. This result only applies
to exit relays that do their own DNS resolution; for relays that
use a third-party resolver, the ASes that are traversed between
the exit relay and its DNS resolver is the metric of interest.
We conclude that adversaries that are unable to observe a
Tor user’s TCP connection still have many opportunities to
see a TCP connection’s corresponding DNS request. Such
adversaries include (i) popular open DNS resolvers such as
Google and OpenDNS, (ii) DNS root servers, and (iii) network
adversaries located on the path to the previous two entities.
B. Determining how Tor exit relays resolve DNS queries
Having shown that the Internet provides ample opportunity
for AS-level adversaries to snoop on DNS traffic from exit
relays, we now investigate how the exit relays in the Tor
network resolve DNS queries in practice. Before this study, we
only had anecdotal evidence (e.g., from OpenDNS-powered
error messages [50, § 4.1]) that some exit relays would
occasionally show.
We identify the DNS resolver of all exit relays by using
exitmap [49], a scanner for Tor exit relays. Exitmap automates
4The tool we developed for this purpose is available online at https://github.
com/NullHypothesis/ddptr.
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Fig. 2. Our AS exposure metric λ for Alexa’s Top 1,000 web sites. For half
of all sites, 60% of ASes or more are only traversed for DNS resolution, but
not for subsequent web traffic.
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Fig. 3. Our method to identify the DNS resolvers of exit relays. Over each
exit relay, we resolve relay-specific domain names that are under our control.
Inspecting our DNS server logs, we can then identify the IP address of all
exit relay resolvers.
running a task such as fetching a webpage over all one thou-
sand exit relays, making it possible to see the Internet through
the “eyes” of every single exit relay. Using exitmap, we resolve
unique, relay-specific domains over each exit relay, to a DNS
server under our control. Figure 3 illustrates this experiment.
To improve reliability, we configured exitmap to use two-
hop circuits instead of the standard three-hop circuits. The
first hop was a guard relay under our control. Over each exit
relay, we resolved a unique domain PREFIX.tor.nymity.ch.
The prefix consisted of the relay’s unique 160-bit fingerprint,
concatenated to a random 40-bit string whose purpose is to
prevent caching, so exit relays indeed resolve each query
instead of responding with a cached element. We controlled
the authoritative DNS server of tor.nymity.ch, so we could
capture both the IP address and packet content of every single
query for tor.nymity.ch.
An exit relay can either run its own resolver, as shown in
the left exit relay in Figure 3; or rely on a third-party resolver,
such as the one provided by its ISP, as shown in the right
exit relay in Figure 3. If an exit relay runs its own resolver,
we expect to receive a DNS request from the exit relay’s
IP address, but if an exit relay uses a third-party resolver,
we expect to receive a request from an unrelated IP address.
Having encoded relay-specific fingerprints in the query names,
we are able to map queries to exit relays in such cases. We ran
this experiment from September 2015 to May 2016, at least
once a day. Once we started to analyze our data, we identified
the following two challenges:
• DNS proxies: We found that several exit relays used
DNS proxies—machines that passed on DNS requests
to an actual resolver instead of resolving it themselves.
Google’s server 8.8.8.8 is a popular example of a
User The Tor network
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DNS server
WF attack
DNSGuard
HTTP
DNS requests
Tor
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ffic
Fig. 5. An overview of the DefecTor attack. An adversary must monitor both
ingress (encrypted Tor traffic) and egress (DNS request) traffic. A AS-level
adversary between the client and its guard monitors ingress traffic. The same
adversary monitors egress traffic between the exit and a DNS server, or the
DNS server itself. Both ingress and egress traffic then serve as input to the
DefecTor attack.
DNS proxy; several dozen machines perform reso-
lution in the background [20]. DNS proxies do not
interfere with our measurements, so we ignored them.
• Multiple DNS resolvers: On Linux systems, DNS
resolution is controlled by the file /etc/resolv.conf.
It contains a list of up to three DNS resolvers that
are queried in order. If the primary resolver does not
respond within a time limit, the system falls back
to the second, and finally the third resolver. Our
data suggests that several exit relays used different
resolvers in subsequent exitmap scans—one relay, for
example, used both Google’s DNS resolver and one
provided by its ISP. For our visualization, we only
consider the first resolver we observed for an exit
relay, which might not be the primary resolver.
Figure 4 illustrates the fraction of DNS requests that four of the
most popular organizations could observe. Google averages at
33%, but at times saw more than 40% of all DNS requests
exiting the Tor network—an alarming number for a single
organization. Second to Google is “Local”—exit relays that
run their own resolver, averaging at 12%. Next is OVH, which
used to be as popular as local resolvers, but slowly lost its
share over time. Note that in contrast to Google, OVH does
not run a public DNS server; the company’s resolvers are only
accessible to its customers. Finally, there is OpenDNS, which
also runs public DNS resolvers. OpenDNS saw occasional
spikes in popularity but always remained in the single digits.
Apart from the illustrated top resolver setups, the distribution
has a long tail, presumably consisting of many ISP resolvers.
V. DEFECTOR ATTACKS
As with conventional correlation attacks, an attacker must
observe traffic that is both entering and exiting the Tor
network; in contrast to threat models from previous work,
we incorporate DNS instead of only TCP traffic. Figure 5
illustrates our correlation attack; it requires the following
building blocks:
• Ingress sniffing: An attacker must observe traffic that
is entering the Tor network. The attacker can operate
on the network level, as a malicious ISP or an intelli-
gence agency. In addition, the attacker can operate on
the relay level by running a malicious Tor guard relay.
In both cases, the attacker can only observe encrypted
data, so packet lengths and directions are the main
inputs for website fingerprinting [37].
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Fig. 4. The popularity of some of the most popular DNS resolvers of exit relays over time. The y axis depicts the fraction of exit bandwidth that the respective
resolver is responsible for. Google’s DNS resolver is by far the most popular, at times serving more than 40% of all DNS requests coming out of the Tor
network. Google is followed by local resolvers, which average at around 12%. Once serving a fair amount of traffic, OVH dropped in popularity, and is now
close to OpenDNS, an organization that runs an open resolver.
• Egress sniffing: To observe both ends of the commu-
nication, an attacker must also observe egress DNS
traffic. We expect the adversary either to be on the
path between exit relay and a DNS server or to run
a malicious DNS resolver or server. An attacker may
also run an exit relay, but in this case conventional
end-to-end correlation attacks [34] are at least as
effective as those we describe here.
We combine a conventional website fingerprinting attack oper-
ating on traffic from ingress sniffing with DNS traffic observed
by egress sniffing, creating DefecTor attacks. Our attacks
correlate the websites observed by the website fingerprinting
attack in ingress traffic with the websites identified from DNS
traffic. Next, we describe how we simulate the DNS traffic
from Tor exits, how we map DNS requests to websites, and
finally present our two DefecTor attacks.
A. Approximating DNS traffic from Tor exits
We first investigate the type and volume of DNS traffic that
Tor’s exit relays send. There are no logs of outgoing traffic
from Tor exit relays available to us, and ethical considerations
kept us from trying to collect them (e.g., by operating exit
relays and recording all the outgoing traffic). We therefore opt
to approximate the DNS traffic emerging from Tor exit relays
by (i) building a model of typical Tor users’ website browsing
patterns, (ii) collecting a minimally invasive dataset of DNS
traffic, and (iii) accounting for the effects of DNS caching.
1) Modeling which sites Tor users visit: We first build a
model to approximate which websites Tor users visit. As of
July 2016, there are about 173 million active websites [35];
the Alexa ranking [4] gives insights into their popularity based
on the browsing behavior of a sample of all Internet users. The
distribution of the popularity of these websites has previously
been fit to a power-law distribution based on the rank of
the website [31, 11, 2]. For the pageview numbers of the
Alexa top 10,000 websites, we found a power-law distribution
to be a good fit as neither a log-normal nor a power-law
distribution with exponential cutoff (i.e., a truncated power-
law distribution) offered significantly better fits. We used the
Python powerlaw package [3] for fitting and picked a power-
law distribution with an α parameter of about 1.13. When
varying the fitting parameter xmin that determines beyond
which minimum value the power-law behavior should hold
in the provided data, we can get different α values. We
made a conservative choice of picking this smaller α value
as it underestimates the popularity of popular websites and
therefore is worse for the attacker.5 Thus, we use a power-law
distribution to model what websites Tor users visit. This might
overestimate the popularity of higher-ranked websites such as
Facebook and YouTube because we believe that Tor users—
who tend to be privacy-conscious—are more likely to seek out
alternatives than the typical Internet user. We will discuss the
implications of our model for browsing behavior later.
2) Modeling how often Tor users visit each site: Next,
we determine how many websites Tor users visit in a certain
time span. We approximated this number by setting up an exit
relay whose exit policy included only ports 80 and 443, so
our relay would only forward web traffic. We then used the
tool tshark to capture the timestamps of DNS requests—but
no DNS responses. We made sure that our tshark filter did
not capture packet payloads or headers, so we were unable to
learn what websites Tor users were visiting. In addition, we
patched tshark to log timestamps at a five-minute granularity.
The coarse timing granularity allows us to publish this dataset
with minimal privacy implications; Section VIII-A discusses
the ethical implications of this experiment in more detail. We
ran the experiment for approximately two weeks from May
15, 2016 to May 31, 2016, which allowed us to determine
the number of DNS requests for 4,832 five-minute intervals.
Figure 6 shows this time series, but for clarity we only plot
May 25, 2016. The distribution’s median is 105. The time
series features several spikes; the most significant one counts
1,410 DNS requests. We repeated the same experiment with the
so-called reduced exit policy6 because it contains several dozen
more ports and it is more popular among Tor relay operators;
as of August 2016, it is used by 7.8% of exit relays by capacity.
In comparison, the exit policy containing only port 80 and 443
only accounts for 1.5%. The reduced exit policy resulted in a
median of 102 DNS requests per five minutes, so the difference
between both policies is only three DNS requests.
We then interpolate these numbers to all Tor exit re-
lays based on their published bandwidth statistics. While we
measured a median of 105, the mean of the distribution
was 119.3 per five minutes during a two-week period. From
DNS statistics of the Alexa top one million websites (see
Section V-B) we know that one website visit causes outgoing
5Alexa’s page-view numbers ignore multiple visits by the same user on the
same day (see https://support.alexa.com/hc/en-us/articles/200449744), so the
ranking might be slightly off when modeling website visit patterns.
6The reduced exit policy is available online at https://trac.torproject.org/
projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReducedExitPolicy.
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Fig. 6. The number of DNS requests per five-minute interval on our exit
relay for May 25, 2016. Using a privacy-preserving measurement method, we
only determined approximate timestamps and no content.
DNS requests for 10.3 domains on average (assuming a power-
law distribution of site popularity as described above, and
taking into account Tor’s caching of pending DNS requests,
ensuring that multiple requests sent by clients for the same
domain name only result in one outgoing request by the exit).
This means that we had an average of about 23.2 website
visits per ten minutes on our exit relay. Assuming that the two
main factors influencing the volume of DNS requests are a
relay’s bandwidth and exit policy, and having shown that the
exit policy does not significantly impact the number of DNS
requests, we can scale this number up to the whole Tor network
using the provided bandwidth of exit relays. In particular,
we use the self-reported bandwidth information from Tor exit
relays collected in the so-called extra-info descriptors available
on CollecTor [43] and estimate the number of website visits
on each of the about 1,200 exit relays active at that time.
The resulting average total number of websites visited through
the Tor network is about 288,000 websites per ten minutes.
This number can, however, only be considered to be a rough
estimate, as the interpolation is based on only one exit relay
and the bandwidth data of the other exit relays is self-reported
and might therefore be incorrect or incomplete. For instance,
the result might under-estimate the size of the Tor network if
not all exit relays published their complete bandwidth statistics
for the considered two-week period.
Recently, Jansen and Johnson [23] measured that the
average number of active web (port 80 and 443) circuits
in Tor amounts to about 700,000 per ten minutes.7 Tor
Browser, The Tor Project’s fork of Firefox, builds one circuit
per website entered in the URL bar. How long the circuit
remains active depends on Tor Browser settings (primarily
MaxCircuitDirtiness currently set to ten minutes) and how
long TCP streams in the circuit are active: as long as at least
one stream is active, the circuit remains active. Each time
a new stream is attached to a circuit, the circuit’s dirtiness
timeout is reset. The number of active circuits serves as an
upper bound for the number of websites visited over Tor:
visiting different pages of a website will use the same circuit,
and visiting a new website will construct a new circuit. Users
visiting several pages of a website and websites with long-
lived reoccuring connections, like Twitter and Facebook with
continuously updating feeds, all lower the number of websites
visited in Tor relative to the number of active circuits. For
our model we consider the upper bound of 700,000 to be the
number of websites visited through the Tor network per ten
7This number comes from a preprint kindly shared by the authors and might
change in the final version.
minutes. This is a conservative choice as more website visits
increase the anonymity set of websites possibly visited by a
Tor user—and therefore reduces the information an attacker
can gain from observed DNS data. In later sections we revisit
the implications of our choice by both scaling the Tor network
up to ten-times its estimated size, and scaling it down to the
size of 288,000 website visits per ten minutes that we got from
our own interpolation described above.
3) Modeling the effects of DNS caching at Tor exits: To
analyze which DNS requests the adversary can see, we need to
take caching of DNS responses into account. We ignore client-
side DNS caching since it is disabled by default, as described
in Section II. On the exit relays, which perform DNS resolution
on behalf of Tor clients, caching is relevant because all Tor
clients using the same exit relay share its cache. An exit relay
maintains its own DNS cache8 (in addition to the cache of its
DNS resolver) and enforces a minimum TTL of 60 seconds
and a maximum TTL of 30 minutes.9 We refer to this as Tor’s
TTL clipping. However, due to a bug in the source code that
we identified,10 the TTL of all DNS responses is set to 60
seconds.
If a Tor client attempts to resolve a domain that an exit
relay already has in its cache, the adversary will be unable
to observe this request. However, the adversary can record all
observed DNS requests over the past x seconds, where x is
the maximum TTL value (i.e., maintain a sliding window of
length x). If a Tor client is attempting to resolve a domain
name, the request is either cached or not. If it is not cached,
the adversary will see it as a new, outgoing DNS request from
the exit relay. If it is cached, it must have been resolved by
the exit relay in the last x seconds, and will therefore be in
the sliding window. The sliding window technique allows the
attacker to observe all DNS requests, regardless of if they are
cached or not at Tor exits.
We assume that an adversary applies this sliding window
technique and models the observable DNS data accordingly.
The attacker observes a fraction of Tor’s exit bandwidth for
a specific window length, and together with our website visit
frequency estimation, this triggers a number of website visits
in our simulation. For each visit event, we randomly draw a
website using the power-law website popularity distribution
described above and put its DNS requests into the window.
As we will see next, we do not need to simulate or consider
the fact that the observed fraction of Tor exit bandwidth
corresponds to many different exits with individual caches.
B. Inferring website visits from DNS requests
Given a sliding window of DNS requests, we investigate
how this information can help determine whether a user has
visited a website of interest. In April 2016, we visited the
Alexa top one million websites five times, and collected
all DNS requests that each visit of a website’s frontpage
generated. We refer to the data collected for one visit as
a sample. We performed these measurements in five rounds
8The code is available online at https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/
or/dns.c?id=tor-0.2.9.1-alpha.
9The code is available online at https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/
or/dns.c?id=tor-0.2.9.1-alpha#n209.
10The bug report is available online at https://bugs.torproject.org/19025.
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TABLE I. THE PERCENTAGE OF WEBSITES ON ALEXA TOP-1 MILLION
WEBSITES USING PROVIDERS INVOLVED IN CENSORING OR RESTRICTING
ACCESS FROM TOR [29].
Description Percentage
Website behind CloudFlare IP 6.44
Domain on website uses CloudFlare 25.81
Domain on website uses Akamai 33.86
Domain on website uses Google 77.43
Top 1,000 sites
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Fig. 7. The fraction of websites in Alexa’s top one million that have at
least one unique domain. We grouped all domains into 1,000 consecutive,
non-overlapping bins of size 1,000. The vast majority of sites (96.8%) have
unique domains.
from a university network, where each round browsed all one
million websites in a random order before visiting the same
website again. We used Tor Browser 5.5.4 and configured it
not to browse over Tor: Tor Browser ensures that the browser
behavior is identical to a Tor Browser user over Tor. By not
using Tor, we can bypass IP blacklists and CAPTCHAs that
are triggered by IP addresses of exit relays [29]. Table I shows
the percentage of websites in our dataset that are hosted by
CloudFlare or Akamai. We might not be able to access these
websites programatically over Tor as they block or filter exit
relays, as identified by Khattak et al. [29]. We also include
Google, which is prevalent in our dataset and restricts access
to Tor users for Google’s search.
We collected 2,540,941 unique domain names from a total
of 60,828,453 DNS requests. The dataset contains 2,260,534
domains that are unique to a particular website, i.e., are not
embedded on any other top million site; we call these domains
unique domains. Unique domains are particularly interesting
because they reveal to the adversary what sites among the top
million the user has visited. This is not possible for domains
such as youtube.com, simply because many websites embed
YouTube videos. Figure 7 shows the fraction of sites with
unique domains for websites up to Alexa’s top one million. We
grouped all domains into 1,000 consecutive, non-overlapping
bins of size 1,000. For 96.8% of all sites on the Alexa top one
million there exists at least one unique domain. Interestingly,
more popular websites are less likely to have a unique domain
associated with them: only 77% of the first bin—the most
popular 1,000 domains—contain at least one unique domain,
significantly less than the rest of the data.
Table II shows summary statistics for the number of
domains per website. At least half of the sites have ten
domains per website, two of them are unique, suggesting that
an adversary can identify many website visits by observing a
single unique DNS request.
To evaluate the feasibility of mapping DNS requests to
TABLE II. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE NUMBER OF DOMAINS PER
WEBSITE IN THE ALEXA TOP 1 MILLION. MORE THAN HALF OF THE SITES
EMBED TWO DOMAINS THAT ARE UNIQUE TO THAT SITE.
Domains Median Mean ± Stddev Min. Max.
Per site 10 12.2±11.2 1 397
Unique per site 2 2.3± 1.8 0 363
websites, we construct a naïve website classifier that maps the
unique domains in a set of DNS requests to the corresponding
website that contains a matching set of domains. With five-
fold cross-validation on our Alexa top one million dataset
(with five samples per site), we consider a closed world and
an open world. In the closed world, the attacker can use
samples from all sites in training; in the open world, some
sites are unmonitored and therefore unknown (as per the fold).
The closed-world evaluation yields 0.955 recall. In the open-
world evaluation, we monitor the Alexa top 500,000 with five
samples each and consider 433,000 unmonitored sites. The
number of unmonitored sites is determined by our power-law
distribution to represent a realistic base rate (for the entire
Tor network) for evaluating our classifier: on average, for
sites on Alexa top 500,000 to be visited 2.5 million times
there will be about 433,000 visits to sites outside of Alexa
top 500,000. Our classifier does not take into account the
popularity of websites. The open-world evaluation yields a
recall of 0.947 for a precision of 0.984. By accounting for the
order of requests, per-exit partitioning of DNS requests, TTLs,
and website popularity, we expect that classifying website
visits from DNS requests might be made even more accurate.
Further, a closed world is a realistic setting: determining the
DNS requests made by all 173 million active websites on
the Internet is practical, even with modest resources. We use
the conservative open world results when simulating the Tor
network and the attacker’s success in mapping DNS requests
to websites. We conclude from our results that observing DNS
requests coming out of Tor is almost as effective at identifying
websites as observing the web traffic itself.
C. Classifiers for DefecTor attacks
We use Wa-kNN from Wang et al. [46] (described in
Section II) and a list of sites derived from observing DNS
requests to implement two DefecTor attacks:
ctw We “close the world” on a Wa-kNN classifier
that we modified to consider only the distance
to observed sites when calculating the k-nearest
neighbors. The classifier still considers the dis-
tance to all unmonitored sites.
hp When Wa-kNN classifies a trace as a monitored
site, confirm that we observed the same site in the
DNS data (ensuring high precision). If not, make
the final classification unmonitored.
These approaches apply to any website fingerprinting attack.
The ctw attack increases the effectiveness of conventional
website fingerprinting attacks by making them more akin to a
closed-world setting, where websites have known fingerprints
and often the world is of limited size. Conceptually, the attack
could also include a custom weight-learning run—training only
on observed sites—but our initial results noted little to no gain,
despite significant increases in testing time. We expect that
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this is due to the fact that some features of traffic traces are
more useful than others, regardless of the training data [21].
The hp attack only produces a positive classification if both
ingress and egress traffic are consistent, resulting in a simple
but effective classifier.
VI. EVALUATING DEFECTOR ATTACKS
A. Attack precision and recall
To evaluate our DefecTor attacks, we collected traffic
traces in May 2016 using Tor Browser 5.5.4. We modified
Tor Browser to not generate network traffic on launch (i.e.,
check for updates, extensions, etc.), and we modified Tor
(bundled with Tor Browser) to log incoming and outgoing
cells. We then performed 100 downloads for each site in the
Alexa top 1k and one download for each site in the Alexa
top (1k,101k]. We randomly distributed these measurement
tasks to a Docker fleet; each download used a fresh circuit
without guard relay, and a fresh copy of Tor Browser for up
to 60 seconds, in line with the recommendations by Wang and
Goldberg [47, § 4]. We cached Tor’s network consensus to
avoid causing excessive load on the network. We considered
the measurement to be successful if we managed to resolve
the domain of the site; we did not prune our dataset further,
neglecting issues like CloudFlare CAPTCHAs, outliers, control
cells, and localized domains [26]. Presumably, this means
that we will underestimate the effectiveness of our attack, but
we are primarily interested in the difference between website
fingerprinting attacks and DefecTor attacks [47].
We perform ten-fold cross-validation for all of our exper-
iments in the open world setting, monitoring 1,000 sites with
100 instances each, and 100,000 unmonitored sites. Note the
1:1 ratio between monitored traces and unmonitored traces,
ensuring that for the classifier there is equal probability in
the testing phase that a trace is a monitored or unmonitored
site. In other words, the base rate is 0.5 in our experiments.
Furthermore, for all experiments we specify the starting Alexa
rank of the monitored sites when simulating sites visited over
the Tor network. We always use the same sample data for
website fingerprinting. When monitoring 1,000 sites starting at
rank 1, sites [1,1000] are monitored and Alexa [1001,101000]
unmonitored. Starting to monitor Alexa from rank 100 means
that Alexa sites [101,1100] are monitored, and Alexa [1,100]
and [1101,10100] unmonitored. We never monitor an unmon-
itored site or vice versa. How popular monitored sites are is a
key factor in the effectiveness of our attacks.
Figure 8 shows the recall and precision for our DefecTor
attacks as a function of the percentage of observed Tor exit
bandwidth by the attacker monitoring Alexa sites for sites
whose ranks are 10,000 or less. For recall, both ctw and hp
are bound by the percentage of exit bandwidth observed by
the attacker (the percentage is an upper bound). It is simply
not possible to identify a monitored site in the DNS data that
the attacker does not see. At 100% of exit bandwidth, ctw sees
better recall than wf. For hp the results suggest that:
recallhp = recallwf ∗pct (2)
The above relationship only holds when observing DNS re-
quests gives a clear advantage to hp in terms of precision
over wf (see the following paragraph). For precision the hp
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Fig. 8. Recall and precision for an open-world dataset with monitored sites
at Alexa rank 10k and lower. We compare our DefecTor attacks (ctw and hp)
to a conventional website fingerprinting attack (wf) for different percentages
of observed exit bandwidth.
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Fig. 9. The recall and precision when varying the starting Alexa rank of
monitored sites for 100 percentage of exit bandwidth.
attack has an immediate gain over wf as soon as the attacker
can observe any exit bandwidth. Although the hp attack has
near-perfect precision, the ctw attack benefits from observing
increasingly more exit traffic, nearly reaching the same levels
as hp at 100% of the exit bandwidth.
Figure 9 shows recall and precision at 100% of observed
Tor exit bandwidth as a function of the starting Alexa rank
of monitored sites (we still monitor 1,000 sites). For popular
websites (i.e., websites with a high Alexa ranking), there is
no difference between our attacks and the wf attack. This
is because even with a window of only 60 seconds, it is
almost certain that at least one user visited any of the most
popular sites over Tor. For sites that rank 1,000 or lower
(i.e., less popular sites), both DefecTor attacks show a clear
improvement in precision while ctw also shows improved
recall—but only at 100% observed exit bandwidth, as shown in
Figure 8. These results paint a bleak picture: a small fraction of
exit bandwidth provides a perfectly precise attack on relatively
unpopular sites such as wikileaks.org, which had Alexa rank
10,808 on April 15th 2016.
B. Sensitivity analysis
To better understand the extent and limitations of our
attacks, we study the sensitivity of our results to website
fingerprinting defenses, TTL clipping, the growth of the Tor
network, and website popularity distribution. In this section,
we assume that an adversary can observe Tor exit relays
representing 33% of exit bandwidth (as observed on average by
Google) and consider only precision (where we see clear gain
from both our attacks). Unless stated otherwise, we perform
our evaluation on websites starting at Alexa rank 10,000 and
proceeding through less popular websites, use 2,500 weight-
learning rounds, have a 60-second window size, a Tor network
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Fig. 10. The effect on attack precision. The defaults are: Alexa from top
10,000, 2,500 weight-learning rounds, 60-second window size, Tor network
scale 1.0, and the conservative power-law distribution (pc) with α = 1.13.
scale of 1.0, and use the conservative power-law distribution
from Section V-A1.
1) Effect of website fingerprinting defenses: Website fin-
gerprinting defenses are being designed and discussed for
deployment in Tor [39]. The defenses produce bandwidth
and/or latency overhead, with a significant increase in overhead
as the defense becomes stronger. For example, Juarez et
al. observe an exponential increase in bandwidth overhead
as the protection of the defense WTF-PAD [27] increases.
This leads to the goal of finding an optimum that provides
strong protection while also keeping the overhead tolerable
for Tor users. As a first attempt to approximate the effect of
fingerprinting defenses on DefecTor attacks, we use Wa-kNN
with random weights and no weight-learning: this significantly
reduces the effectiveness of the attack since some features (like
indices of outgoing packets) are several orders of magnitude
more useful than others [27].
Figure 10(a) shows the effects of between 0 and 3,000
rounds of weight-learning. At few to no rounds, the precision
for the wf attack is below 50%—the classification is more
likely to be wrong than right—while there is no impact on the
hp attack and a relatively small decrease for the ctw attack.
For recall (not shown in the figure), the bound and relationship
is as in Equation 2: for wf, at zero rounds, recall is 0.055;
for hp at zero rounds, recall is 0.019. These results suggest
that for website fingerprinting defenses to be effective against
DefecTor attacks, the defense must be tuned to provide a
low recall even when the parameters of website fingerprinting
attacks are selected for high recall.
2) Effect of Tor’s TTL clipping: As discussed in Sec-
tion V-A, due to a bug in Tor, all exit relays cache DNS
TABLE III. MEDIAN AND MEAN DNS TTL VALUES ACROSS ALEXA
TOP ONE MILLION SITES. RAW TTLS ARE UNPROCESSED, AS THEY
APPEAR IN DNS LOOKUP TRACES. TOR TTLS ADHERE TO TOR’S TTL
CLIPPING. UNIQUE REFERS TO THE TTLS FOR UNIQUE DOMAINS; MIN
UNIQUE ONLY CONSIDERS THE UNIQUE DOMAINS WITH THE MINIMUM
TTL FOR EACH WEBSITE.
TTLs Median TTL (sec) Mean TTL (sec) ± Stddev
Raw 255 9,780.0±42,930.5Tor 701.5± 755.3
Unique raw 900 13,022.2±35,054.4Unique Tor 1,005.3± 789.6
Min unique raw 60 3,833.9±11,073.6Min unique Tor 644.2± 763.8
responses for 60 seconds, regardless of the DNS response’s
TTL. Therefore, a sliding window covering the last 60 seconds
of all observed DNS requests suffices to capture all monitored
sites through Tor (subject to the fraction of observed Tor exit
bandwidth, and mapping DNS requests to sites).
Table III shows the TTL of DNS records in our Alexa top
one million sites dataset from Section V-B for the TTL as-is
(raw) and when clipped by Tor. (We emulate what the correct
TTL values would be due to TTL clipping supposing that Tor
eventually fixes the aforementioned bug.) For each of these
cases, we also consider TTLs for all unique domains, and for
only the unique domain for each website with the lowest TTL.
About half of the sites on Alexa top one million has a unique
domain with a TTL of 60 seconds or less; 48% of the raw
unique TTLs are below 60 seconds and only 26% above 30
minutes. Fixing the Tor clipping bug is therefore not sufficient;
to mitigate DefecTor attacks, the minimum TTL should be
significantly increased. In this case, we find that Tor’s TTL
clipping has no effect on the median TTL, but significantly
reduces the mean TTL.
Suppose that Tor eventually fixes the DNS TTL bug,
requiring the attacker to monitor DNS lookups for a time
interval equal to the maximum TTL of all unique domains for
any monitored site. Figure 10(b) shows the effect on precision
for different time intervals from 60 seconds to 30 minutes
(Tor’s MAX_DNS_ENTRY_AGE for keeping entries in an exit’s
DNS resolver cache), and for Alexa starting rank 10,000 and
100,000. For ctw, the time interval has a significant effect on
both Alexa starting ranks, while hp is only affected for sites
ranked 10,000 or higher; for less popular sites, the DNS lookup
data still significantly improves fingerprinting precision, even
with the larger window size.
3) Effect of Tor network growth: Figure 10(c) scales the
size of the Tor network with respect to site visits from the
status quo to ten times its size, for Alexa starting rank 10,000
and 100,000. At twice its current size, the impact on DefecTor
attacks is smaller than increasing the minimum TTL for DNS
caching to three minutes as shown in Figure 10(b). These
results indicate that DefecTor attacks will remain practical
for many sites in the Alexa top one million, even as the Tor
network grows.
4) Sensitivity to website popularity distribution: To explore
the sensitivity of our results to different distributions in how
users visit websites, we now evaluate the effectiveness of
DefecTor attacks with four different website distributions:
pc A conservative power-law distribution (with α =
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Fig. 11. The relation among our simulation components. Our goal is to
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1.13) that we manually fitted to the Alexa top
10,000 data, slightly underrepresenting the pop-
ularity of top Alexa sites. We described this
distribution in Section V-A1.
pr A realistic power-law distribution (with α = 1.98)
that is the best fit according to the Python
powerlaw library by Alstott et al. [3] for the Alexa
top 10,000 data.
uc A conservative uniformly random distribution
that only considers one million active websites
browsed over Tor.
ur A realistic uniformly random distribution that
considers 173 million active websites, as reported
by Netcraft in July 2016 for the Internet [35].
Figure 10(d) shows the effect on the precision of the hp attack
for the different distributions as we vary the starting Alexa
rank. The uniform distributions always have nearly perfect pre-
cision. The difference between the two power-law distributions
is about one order of magnitude in terms of starting Alexa
rank: the realistic distribution gets near perfect at 1,000 and
the conservative at 10,000. We conclude that DefecTor attacks
are perfectly precise for unpopular sites where the probability
that someone other than the target browses to a monitored site
within the timeframe given by the window length is negligible.
VII. INTERNET-SCALE ANALYSIS
In the preceding sections we have presented our DefecTor
attacks and evaluated their effectiveness, but we have yet to
understand what entities can mount them. In this section, we
aim to quantify the likelihood that any AS is in a position to
mount DefecTor attacks.
A. Approach
Figure 11 summarizes our simulation approach, which we
detail in the next section. In short, we model the activity of Tor
users and simulate their path selection using TorPS [24]. TorPS
returns guard and exit relays, which we then feed as input—
together with source ASes and destination addresses—into our
framework that runs traceroutes from RIPE Atlas nodes. The
rest of this section describes our approach in detail.
1) Attack model: We assume that an AS can mount Defec-
Tor attacks if it can see both traffic entering the Tor network
and DNS traffic exiting the Tor network. Recall that an exit
relay can perform DNS resolution in two ways; by running
a local resolver, or by relying on a third-party resolver, such
as its ISP’s or Google’s public resolver. In the case of exit
relays that perform local resolution, an effective position for
an attacker is both (i) anywhere on the AS path between a
Tor client and its guard relay; and (ii) anywhere on the path
between an exit relay and any of the name servers the exit has
to communicate with to resolve a domain. These name servers
include the full DNS delegation path, i.e., a root name server
plus subsequent name servers in the DNS hierarchy. All ASes
along the path from the exit relay to the name servers will be
able to see the domain names that the exit relay is querying.
For exit relays that rely on third-party resolvers, the adversary
instead has to be on the path between the exit relay and its
DNS resolver.
2) Simulating Tor user activity with TorPS: To measure
the likelihood that an AS can be in a position to perform
a DefecTor attack, we use TorPS [24]—short for Tor Path
Simulator—which mimics how a Tor client constructs circuits
(see “TorPS” in Figure 11). TorPS takes as input archived
Tor network data [43] and usage models, which are sets of
IP addresses that Tor clients talk to—e.g. web servers. Given
this input, TorPS then simulates for a configurable number of
“virtual” Tor clients the way they would select guard and exit
relays. TorPS is based on the Tor stable release in version
0.2.4.23. For each simulated client, TorPS uses one guard;
this guard selection expires after 270 days. We use TorPS to
simulate the behavior of 100,000 Tor clients for the entire
month of March 2016.
We need to place our simulated Tor clients into an AS
(see “Client models” in Figure 11). We selected clients in
major ISPs in the top-five most popular countries of Tor
usage according to Tor Metrics [44]. As of August 2016,
the top five countries are the U.S., Russia, Germany, France,
and the U.K. For the U.S., we chose Comcast (AS 7922);
for Russia, Rostelecom (AS 42610); for Germany, Deutsche
Telekom (AS 3320); for France, Orange (AS 3215); and for
the U.K., British Telecom (AS 2856).
Having placed simulated Tor clients into ASes, we now
model their activity over Tor (see “Usage models” in Fig-
ure 11). We model each client to have visited several websites
every day in March 2016.11 At 9 a.m. EST, the client visits
mail.google.com and www.twitter.com. At 12 p.m. EST,
the client visits calendar.google.com and docs.google.com.
At 3 p.m. EST, the client visits www.facebook.com and
www.instagram.com. Finally, at 6 p.m. EST, the client visits
www.google.com, www.startpage.com, and www.ixquick.com,
and at 6:20 p.m. EST, the client visits www.google.com,
www.startpage.com, and www.ixquick.com again. Each of
the 100,000 simulated Tor clients thus had 12 · 31 = 372
opportunities to be compromised given 31 days and 12 site
visits per day. TorPS provided a new circuit every ten minutes,
regardless of how many distinct connections the client made
to different sites; it did not provide a new circuit for different
websites if the client visited the group of sites within the same
ten-minute window.
For simplicity, we assume that only one DNS request oc-
curs every time a client visits a site. For example, in our model,
at 9 a.m. one DNS request will occur for mail.google.com and
one DNS request will occur for www.twitter.com. At 6 p.m.
11We modeled our client behavior off of the “Typical” model that Johnson
et al. [25, § 5.1.2] used.
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TABLE IV. THE COVERAGE OF RIPE ATLAS NODES THAT ARE
CO-LOCATED WITH TOR GUARD AND EXIT RELAYS AS OF MAY 2016.
Atlas probe coverage Tor guard ASes Tor exit ASes
By bandwidth 73.59% 57.53%
By number 50.69% 52.25%
three DNS requests will occur, and at 6:20 p.m. those same
three DNS requests will occur again. For now, we do not take
embedded requests (i.e. for embedded website content such as
YouTube videos) or caching into account.
3) Inferring AS-level paths using traceroutes and pyasn:
Our Internet-scale analysis also requires learning the AS-level
paths from each client to its guard, and from its exit to
the destination (see “RIPE Atlas traceroutes” in Figure 11).
We decided against the commonly applied AS path inference
because Juen et al. showed that it can be quite inaccu-
rate [28]. Traceroutes, in contrast, yield significantly more
accurate paths, but are difficult to run from Tor relays: Past
work involved asking relay operators to run traceroutes for
the researchers [28, § 4]. This approach yielded traceroutes
from relays representing 26% of exit bandwidth, but does not
scale well. Instead of running traceroutes from Tor relays, we
leverage the RIPE Atlas [40] platform, a volunteer-run network
measurement platform consisting of thousands of lightweight
and geographically spread probes that can be used as vantage
points for traceroutes. Our key observation is that RIPE Atlas
has probes in many ASes that also have Tor relays. We leverage
this observation by designing measurements to run traceroutes
from Atlas probes that are located in the same AS as exit
relays, to each of the destinations in question.
Table IV shows that for a day in May 2016, we found
that RIPE Atlas had probes in 52% of ASes that contain exit
relays, and in 51% of ASes that contain Tor guard relays.
More importantly, we found that Atlas ASes cover 58% of
exit bandwidth and 74% of guard bandwidth. This statistic is
important given that Tor clients select relays weighted by their
bandwidth, and the bandwidth of Tor relays is not uniformly
distributed. Given the growth of both Tor and Atlas, we expect
these numbers to increase in the future. In addition to Atlas,
we also considered using PlanetLab [1] to initiate traceroutes,
but unfortunately most PlanetLab nodes are located in research
and education networks [6], and are thus not well-suited for
performing our measurements.
We performed traceroutes from the five Tor client ASes
outlined above to all their respective guard relay IP addresses
that TorPS determined. To measure the paths from exit relays
to their DNS resolvers, we performed the following tracer-
outes, simulating four different DNS configurations:
• ISP DNS: To investigate the scenario in which an exit
relay uses its ISP’s resolver, we chose to represent
this as the resolver being in the same AS as the
exit relay. Thus, no traceroutes were necessary for
this experiment. We acknowledge that this is not
necessarily the case, but assume that it holds for the
majority of exit relays.
• Google DNS: This scenario represents an exit relay
using Google’s public resolver. To measure the AS
path, we perform traceroutes from a RIPE Atlas node
in the AS of the exit relay to Google’s public DNS
resolver, i.e., 8.8.8.8.
• Local DNS: To measure the paths that would be
traversed if an exit relay were running its own, local
resolver (e.g., the popular service unbound), we used
the command line tool dig with the +trace option to
determine the iterative resolution process. We tracked
all name server IP addresses from referrals at each
level of the delegation path, and performed traceroutes
to those IP addresses.
• Status quo: This scenario represents the state of the
Tor network as of March 2016, a combination of
the above configurations. Recall that in Section IV-B,
we determined the IP addresses of the resolvers that
exit relays use. We ran traceroutes to these very
IP addresses. For the exit relays that used several
resolvers during March, we randomly assigned one
to the relay. We ended up having data for 73% of the
exit relays that TorPS ended up picking.12
We then mapped each IP address in every traceroute to its
corresponding AS (see “Analysis” in Figure 11). The Python
module pyasn [5] relies on BGP routing tables to perform these
mappings; by using a routing table that coincides with the time
when we performed our traceroutes, we can obtain accurate
AS-level mappings. This method is subject to inaccuracies due
to BGP route hijacks or leaks, but we expect those events to
be relatively unlikely for the time period and IP prefixes that
we are concerned with.
4) Putting it all together: Like Johnson et al. [25, § 4.2],
we consider two security metrics; we aim to estimate (i) the
fraction of compromised streams per simulated Tor user, and
(ii) the amount of time it would take for the first compro-
mise to occur. For both metrics, we consider the four DNS
configurations outlined above. Our simulation can reveal the
respective average threat that a given DNS configuration poses
for Tor users.
The traceroutes described in the previous section yielded
two sets of ASes, one from the Tor users’ ASes to their
guard relays, and one from approximately half of the exit
relays’ ASes to the different destinations, which depend on
the exit relays’ DNS configurations. We intersect both AS sets
(the “ingress” and “egress” hops of Figure 11) and classify
a website visit as compromised if the intersection is non-
empty. As stated earlier, for some exit relays we did not have
associated AS-level paths to a particular destination, either
due to a lack of co-located RIPE Atlas probes, or because
of missing traceroute information. In these cases, we checked
if the exit AS had the potential to launch an attack, and if not,
the stream was considered to be uncompromised in order to
err on the conservative side.
To compute the fraction of compromised streams, we
counted the streams that were compromised for every sim-
ulated user out of a possible maximum of 372. To compute
the time until first compromise, we determined the first stream
in which the user was compromised, took its timestamp, and
calculated the offset from the beginning of March 1, 2016.
12The missing 27% are due to the churn in exit relays. Since we did not run
our exitmap experiment each hour, we were bound to miss some exit relays.
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(b) The time until simulated Tor clients got first compromised.
Fig. 12. The fraction of compromised streams and the time until first
compromise for our simulated Tor clients. We placed these clients in five
popular client ASes in the U.S., the U.K., Russia, France, and Germany.
For exit relays, we consider the status quo (on the very right) plus three
hypothetical DNS configurations for all exit relays. We do not plot outliers
beyond the box plots’ whiskers. In both experiments, the safest configuration
is “ISP DNS only,” i.e. have all exit relays use their ISP’s DNS resolver.
For users that were not compromised during the month of
March, we assigned a maximum value of 31 days as the time
until first compromise, which is reflected in the plots in our
next section. Users who were compromised immediately would
have a value of 0, signifying that they were compromised at
the very beginning of March 1.
B. Results
Figures 12(a) and 12(b) illustrate our results as box plots.
Each figure contains four subfigures, one for each DNS con-
figuration. Each box plot contains five rows, one for each Tor
client AS. For clarity, we did not plot any outliers beyond the
box whiskers.
Both figures show that the “ISP DNS only” setup is the
safest for Tor users, i.e., it exhibits on average the least number
of compromised streams while also on average counting the
most days until compromise. This setup is closely followed by
“Google DNS only,” the status quo, and finally “Local DNS
only,” which fares worse than all other setups. We expected
“ISP DNS only” to do best because if all exit relays use
their ISP’s resolvers, there is only one AS to contend with
on the egress side—the exit relay’s. The Google setup fares
similarly well most likely because of Google’s heavily anycast
infrastructure which minimizes the number of AS hops. The
status quo does significantly better than the “Local DNS”
results, presumably because only around 12% of Tor exit relays
actually do their own resolution. The wide variance observed
in Figure 12(b) for “ISP DNS” and “Google DNS” is due to
using 31 days as a placeholder for simulated clients who were
never compromised. However, a safe configuration against AS-
level adversaries, which our figures capture, is not necessarily
the best setup for Tor users. For example, ISP-provided DNS
resolvers can be misconfigured, subject to censorship, or
simply be a forwarder to Google’s resolver, which already
serves numerous exit relays and whose centralization poses
a threat to the anonymity of Tor users. We will explore this
trade-off in greater detail in Section VIII.
Interestingly, we find differences in our five client ASes.
These differences are particularly striking in Figure 12(b).
For example, for “Google DNS only,” the median time until
compromise differs by around 7 days between DE and UK
and around 8 days between DE and FR. For “ISP DNS only,”
the median time until compromise differs by around 6 days
between US and DE and around 5 days between US and FR.
Also, we notice that DE fares worse than the others in the
“Google DNS only” scenario and better than the others in the
“ISP DNS only” scenario. We conclude that the location of
Tor clients matters and should be considered in future traffic
correlation studies.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we briefly discuss the ethics of our research
and possible ways to defend against DefecTor attacks.
A. Ethical considerations
Section V-A2 discusses how we set up an exit relay to
determine the number of DNS requests per five minute interval.
Since our exit relay was forwarding traffic of real Tor users,
we contacted Princeton University’s institutional review board
(IRB) before running the experiment. Our IRB deemed that
this research did not fall within the realm of human subjects
research. In addition to contacting our IRB, we adhered to The
Tor Project’s ethics guidelines [30]. Specifically, (i) we ensured
that we only collected data that is safe to publish, (ii) we only
collected data we needed, and (iii) we limited the granularity
of the data to minimize the likelihood of reidentification. The
risk to Tor users of this experiment is negligible. As for the
benefits, by conducting this experiment, we can improve our
understanding of the risks that DNS poses to the anonymity
of Tor users and use this understanding to improve protection
for Tor users in the future. Thus, we believe that the benefits
of our experiment outweigh the risks.
B. Defending against DefecTor attacks
We now discuss ways to defend against DefecTor attacks.
We distinguish between short-term solutions that can be im-
plemented quickly (Section VIII-B1), and long-term solutions
that need significantly more work (Section VIII-B2).
1) Short-term solutions: Operators of exit relays face a
dilemma: they must either operate their own resolver, which
exposes DNS queries to network adversaries; or, they must use
a third-party DNS resolver, which exposes DNS queries to a
third party. Clearly, the goal is to minimize exposure of DNS
requests, but there are several dimensions to this. In lieu of
substantial DNS protocol improvements, we can envision three
extreme design points, in which all exit relays use (i) Google’s
DNS resolver; (ii) their own, local resolver; or (iii) the resolver
provided by their ISP. Table V summarizes the important trade-
offs for these three setups; the rest of this section discusses
these design points in more detail. Table V shows three
attributes for our hypothetical DNS setups. “Network-level
Protection” is achieved if AS-level adversaries cannot easily
monitor traffic, “Avoiding Centralization” is achieved if there
are many diverse resolvers instead of a few central ones,
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TABLE V. A COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE DESIGN POINTS FOR DNS
RESOLVER CONFIGURATION, ASSUMING ALL TOR EXIT RELAYS USE THE
SETUP IN QUESTION. SOLID BLACK CIRCLES ARE MOST DESIRABLE.
Setup Network-levelProtection
Avoiding
Centralization
Response
Quality
All Google H# #  
All Local #   
All ISP  H# H#
and “Response Quality” is achieved if DNS responses arrive
quickly and correctly.
If all exit relays were to use Google’s public resolver, the
company would obtain metadata about the activity of all Tor
users, which runs counter to Tor’s design goal of distributing
trust. We clearly should avoid this scenario. Fifield et al.’s [18]
censorship circumvention system meek used to use Google’s
cloud infrastructure to tunnel the traffic of censored users
up until May 2016 [17]. While the system was operational,
thousands of meek clients selected exit relays that use Google’s
public resolver, which means that Google saw both traffic
entering and, partially, exiting the Tor network, allowing the
company to mount DefecTor attacks.
Next, consider a Tor network that only uses local resolvers.
In this case, Tor is fully independent of third-party resolvers,
at the cost of each iterative DNS query being exposed to a
diverse set of ASes in the network, allowing several parties to
learn the DNS queries of Tor users.
Finally, all exit relays could simply use their ISP-provided
resolver. This would minimize the network exposure of DNS
requests as resolvers are frequently in the same AS as exit
relays, and AS-level adversaries would be unable to distinguish
between DNS requests from exit relays and unrelated ISP cus-
tomers. This setup introduces the possibility of misconfigured
and censored DNS resolvers [50, § 4.1]. Besides, just a few
ASes—OVH, for example—host a disproportionate amount of
exit relays, turning them into the centralized data sinks that
Tor aims to avoid.
Considering the above, we believe that exit relay operators
should avoid public resolvers such as Google and OpenDNS.
Instead, they should either use the resolvers provided by their
ISP, or run their own, particularly if the operator’s ISP already
hosts many other exit relays. Local resolvers can further be
optimized to minimize information leakage, by (for example)
enabling QNAME minimization [7].
In addition to making recommendations to exit relay oper-
ators, we can remotely influence the cache of each exit relay’s
resolver. For example, using exitmap, we can continuously
resolve potentially sensitive domains over each exit relay, right
before its TTL is about to expire. In such a setup, an attacker
gains no advantage from observing DNS traffic from the exit
relays because the domain is always in every exit relay’s
resolver cache. This approach scales poorly, considering the
potentially large number of domain names that would need to
be cached (recall that the long tail of unpopular sites are most
vulnerable to DefecTor attacks), but it allows us to eliminate
DNS-based correlation attacks for a select number of sites.
Finally, Tor can fix the Tor clipping bug we discovered
and consider significantly increasing the minimum TTL for
the DNS cache at exit relays to make DefecTor attacks less
precise. This adjustment requires finding the longest acceptable
TTL that does not have a notable negative detriment to user
experience. Further, as soon as the clipping bug is fixed,
website operators of sensitive websites can opt to increase the
TTL of their DNS records.
2) Long-term solutions: Additional practical defenses are
on the horizon. Zhu et al. [51] proposed T-DNS, which em-
ploys several TCP optimizations to transport the DNS protocol
over TLS and TCP. The TLS layer provides confidentiality
between exit relays and their resolvers. Finally, site operators
whose users are particularly concerned about safety should
offer an onion service as an alternative. Facebook, for example,
set up facebookcorewwwi.onion. When connecting to the
onion service, Tor users never leave the Tor network, and hence
do not need DNS (as long as the onion service does not embed
non-onion service content).
Deploying defenses against website fingerprinting attacks
in Tor should be an important long-term goal, as well. Al-
though growing the Tor network will help defend against
DefecTor attacks to some degree, the most important change
is to deploy defenses against these attacks in the first place.
Since DefecTor attacks significantly increase precision of
website fingerprinting attacks, defenses should be designed to
significantly reduce the recall of website fingerprinting attacks,
even when the website fingerprinting attack is configured to
sacrifice precision for recall.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated how AS-level adver-
saries can use DNS traffic from Tor exit relays to launch more
effective correlation attacks, which link the sender and receiver
of traffic in the Tor network. We show how an attacker can use
DNS query traffic to mount perfectly precise DefecTor attacks:
Mapping DNS traffic to websites is highly accurate even with
simple techniques, and correlating the observed websites with
a website fingerprinting attack greatly improves the precision
when monitoring relatively unpopular websites.
Given this more powerful fingerprinting method, we
showed that the threat of DefecTor attacks against the Tor
network is clear and present. We first developed a method
to identify the DNS resolver for each Tor exit relay, and
found that a set of exit relays comprising 40% of all Tor
exit relay bandwidth use the Google public DNS servers.
Although this concentration of DNS query traffic reduces the
expanse of ASes that can see DNS query traffic emanating
from exit nodes, this configuration nonetheless gives a single
administrative entity considerable visibility into the traffic that
is exiting the Tor network. Tor relay operators should take
steps to ensure that the network maintains more diversity into
how exit relays resolve DNS domains.
On the other hand, iterative DNS resolution from a Tor
exit relay allows a greater number of ASes to observe DNS
queries from Tor exit relays. For the Alexa most popular 1,000
websites, about 60% of the DNS lookups required to resolve
the website’s DNS domain name traversed ASes that were not
on the end-to-end network path between the client and the
resolved IP address for the webserver. To mitigate the risk
of correlation attacks in light of this finding, we suggest that
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local DNS resolvers on Tor exit relays implement privacy-
preserving techniques such as DNS QNAME minimization,
which minimizes the amount of information about the domain
name that each iterative query contains.
Website fingerprinting attacks have long been a concern
for the Tor network. The attacks that we present in this paper
show that, when incorporating DNS query traffic, these attacks
become even more accurate and powerful. We hope these
findings underscore the urgency of eventually deploying strong
defenses against fingerprinting attacks on the Tor network.
We publish all our code, data, and replication instructions
on our project page, which is available online at https://nymity.
ch/tor-dns/.
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